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LAW NOTES
AN ANALYSIS OF DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER IN SOUTH CAROLNA
"With the growing complexity of modern life, the multi-
plication of subject of governmental regulation, the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers
by the legislature."1
The foregoing is a quotation found in several South Carolina
decisions. On the surface it illustrates an awareness by the
South Carolina Court of problems it is facing today. There
has been a tremendous growth in recent years of the adminis-
trative process. Very few individuals have been left untouched
by this sudden growth whereby the average person has become
affected much more by the administrative process than by
the judicial process.2 Accompanying this growth has been a
transfer of power from the legislature to the agencies. This
transfer has produced many problems, and foremost among
them are the rules invalidating delegations of legislative
power. The legal practitioner will be increasingly faced with
problems in this field of administrative law. A thorough
understanding of the "delegation doctrine" is basic to a suc-
cessful handling of such cases. This note will attempt to
acquaint persons with the pitfalls encountered when concerned
with delegations of legislative power and the entanglements
of the "delegation doctrine". An examination of the South
Carolina decisions on the subject will reveal whether the
holdings of the Court are in accord with the introductory
quotation.
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
"DELEGATION DocTRiNE"
In order to comprehend the workings of the "delegation
doctrine" an examination of the reasons suggested for the
doctrine is imperative.
One of the basic cornerstones of our governmental system
is a separation of powers--legislative, executive, and judicial.
1. State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 470, 150 S.E. 269
(1929); Dillon Catfish Drainage District v. Bank of Dillon, 143 S.C. 178,
183, 141 S.E. 274 (1927).
2. 1 DAvIS, ADMINIsTRATIVm LAW TRETAnns § 1.02 (1958).
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Frequently this separation is given as a reason for the "dele-
gation doctrine," All agree that a needed function is served by
this rule; however, the separation is not, and from the nature
of things cannot be total.3 It has been suggested that the true.
effect of the rule is only that those powers definitely assigned
to one branch are non-delegable, leaving the remaining func-
tions free to be delegated.4
Another reason suggested as a basis of the "delegation doc-
trine" is the maxim, "delegata potestas non potest delegari,"
which means that an agent cannot transfer his delegated
authority to another, it being a trust or confidence reposed
in him personally. Over the years the meaning of the word
"agent" has been stretched to include the legislature, thus
resulting in the maxim being used as a reason for invalidating
delegations of legislative power. Of Roman origin, it has at-
tained in American law the dignity of a constitutional law
principle. However a critical analysis of the maxim has shown
that "the whole doctrine, insofar as it is asserted to be a
principle of constitutional law is built upon the thinnest of
implication, or is the product of the unwritten super constitu-
tion." 5 Even though the basis of the maxim has been severely
-questioned, a number of courts continue to cite it as the chief
reason for their application of the delegation doctrine. Au-
thorities today feel that the origins of the maxim can hardly
help solve twentieth century problems of delegation. 6
A third reason for the doctrine is the idea that the function
of legislating has been entrusted and referred to the legislators
by the people as a trust or mandate to be personally exercised
by them. This principle developed separately and at a later
date than did the maxim, but for all practical purposes the
same result is reached. In either case the idea of delegation is
inconsistent with, and in direct opposition to these principles.
South Carolina courts have not lingered over, or delved very
deeply into the origins or reasons behind the non-delegation of
legislative functions doctrine. Instead, our Court has relied
on noted constitutional law authorities and accepted as a long
3. Paddell v. City of N. Y., 211 U.S. 446, 53 L. Ed. 275 (1908).
4. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YAL.E L. 3.
892 (1917).
5. Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potesta non Potest Delegari: A
Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CoNML. L. Q. 168 (1929).
6. 1 DAVIS, ADMnSmATIVm LAW TR ATIS, § 2.02 (1958).
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standing rule of constitutional law the doctrine that legislative
power cannot be delegated. In the leading case of State ex. rel.
Richards v. Moorer7 the court stated it is a primary principle
that in our system of government the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments must be kept separate and inde-
pendent. The Court then quoted with approval the following
quotation from Cooley's Constitutional limitations:
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that
the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated by that department to any other body
or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state
has located the authority, there it must remain; and by
the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made,
until the constitution itself is changed. The power to
whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high pe-
rogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the
power shall be devolved; nor can it substitute the judg-
ment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those
for which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust."
Therefore, South Carolina, along with other jurisdictions,
took the doctrine as being a long standing rule, and applied it
in subsequent cases without an inquiry into the reasons or
origins of the doctrine.
It is believed that the question of delegation of legislative
power was first raised in The Brig Aurora,9 an 1813 U. S.
Supreme Court decision; however the case does not support the
proposition that legislative power cannot be delegated. It
decided only that a statute enacted by Congress should become
effective upon the happening of a future contingency, in this
case the issuance of a proclamation by the President of the
United States. The most celebrated of the early decisions in-
volving this point was Locke's Appeal,10 decided in 1872. The
question involved was whether to allow the voters to vote on
a question of granting licenses to sell intoxicating liquors.
The court in Locke's Appeal stated: "that a power conferred
7. State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, Supra note 1.
8. Id. at 469; See Vesta Mills v. City Council, 60 S.C. 1, 38 S.E. 226,
228 (1901) where Court relied on same quotation.
9. The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382, 3 L. Ed. 378 (U.S. 1813). See
also Wayman v. Southard, 19 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 253 (U.S. 1825).
10. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716 (1872).
512 [Vol. 14
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upon an agent because of his fitness and the confidence re-
posed in him cannot be delegated by him to another, is a
general and admitted rule. Legislatures stand in this relation
to the people whom they represent. (Application of the
maxim, 'delegata potestas non potest delegari'.) Hence it is
a cardinal principle of representative government, that the
legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws to any
other body or authority."" Early S. C. decisions rely heavily
on this and other quotations from Locke's Appeal as a basis
for their decisions and as authority for the principle that
legislative power cannot be delegated. 12
In an effort to reconcile the "delegation doctrine" with the
decisions where delegations were upheld, the courts first
began to draw a distinction between the power to make
the laws and the subsidiary power to fill up the details. A
difference was found in the legislative power and the exercise
by an agency of authority and discretion to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law, and in the execution of it. How-
ever, if we subject these distinctions to a close examination
we can readily see that administrative agencies determine
what the law shall be every day. The Federal law has long
recognized the fallacy in such reasoning.13 A few state courts
have also recognized this truth. In a 1928 opinion the Wiscon-
sin Court stated, "It only leads to confusion and error to say
that the power to fill up the details and promulgate rules and
regulations is not legislative power."'14 South Carolina, as has
the majority of states, continued to cling to this meaningless
distinction and utilized it as a basis of sustaining delegations
of legislative power. In Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood we
find this often quoted statement from Locke's Appeal:
Then the true distinction, I conceive, is this: the legis-
lature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it
can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
fact or state of things, upon which the law makes or
intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this
11. Id. at 494
12. State v. Ross, 185 S.C. 472, 194 S.E. 439 (1937); State ex rel.
Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929) ; Vesta Mills v. City
Council, supra note 8; State v. Moorehead, 42 S.C. 211, 219, 20 S.E. 544
(1894) (dissenting opinion). Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C.
519, 9 S.E. 650 (1888).
13. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 8, 53 L. Ed. 371
(1908).
14. State ex reL. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis.
472, 220 N.W. 929, 941 (1928).
1962]
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would-be to stop the wheels of government. There are
many things upon which wise and useful legislation must
depend, which cannot be known to the law making power,
and must, therefore be a subject of inquiry and determina-
tion outside of the halls of legislation.15
The same result is reached in phrasing the distinction this
way:
The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the laws, which involves discretion as to what
the law should be, and conferring an authority or dis-
cretion as to it execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.'0
Although the idea of "filing up the details" still persists as
.a means of validating a delegation, in recent years the success
or failure of a delegation of legislative power has hinged on
the finding by the court of a sufficient "standard'.' to guide
the administrative action. Increasingly, the courts have :re-
quired that the legislative body state a "standard" to guide the
agency in its work, and the attempted delegation will be- held
to be unconstitutional if this has not been done.
'In a 1955 decision, Justice Oxner speaking for the court in a
unanimous opinion said, "it is necessary thatfthe statute de-
clare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for car-
rying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the
administrative officer or body must conform."' 17 And in the
recent case of Cole v. Manning'8 which was filed May 3, 1962,
both the majority opinion and dissent adopt the principle re-
quiring standards.
Although this sounds simple enough, problems arise when
we try to fit this to an actual situation and determine if the
language used in the statute constitutes a sufficient standard.
Our dilemma is increased when we turn to the cases and seek
to fit our wording into what the court has held to be a valid
qtandard.
15. Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, supra, note 12 at 524.
16. Ruff v. Boulware, Co. Supervisors, 135 S.C. 420, 426, 131 S.E. 24
(1925). This principle was also set forth in other state decisions: See
Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S.C. 362, 368, 170 S.E. 435 (1933);
Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 169, 155 S.E. 202 (1922); Vesta
Mills v. City Council, supra note 8.
17. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 544, 86
S.E.2d 466 (1955).
18. Cole v. Manning, 125 S.E.2d 621 (S.C. 1962).
[Vol. 14
5
Floyd: An Analysis of Delegation of Legislative Power in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons,
19623 LAW NOTES
An analysis of the South Carolina decisions later on in the
artijle will help clarifythis situation. At this point it is. only
necessary that we .recognize the existence. of such a require-
ment.
ItIbecomes helpful now-to take a. look at the federal law on
the subject of delegation. As we shall discover, it has pro-
gre4sed far more.rapidly than state law, and is perhaps twenty
to thirty years ahead in its development .on the-subject of
delegation. - Early opinions of -the U.S. Supreme Court were
filled with statements such as this one found in a 1932 de-
cision: "That the legislative power of Congress cannot be
delegated is of course, clear.'' 19 . A number of these older
decisions also contained much reference to, and emphasis on,
the. necessity of "standards." A statement of the court in the
Rock' Royal case illustrates this: "Each enactment must be
considered to determine whether it states the purpose which
Co. r s seeks to accomplish and the standards by which that
purpose is to be worked out with sufficient , exactness to.
enable those affected to understand these limits.' ' 20t
Regardless of the repeated referenice to "standards", only
in fhree cases has the United States Supreme* Court invali-
dated Federal Statutes fdr lack of stanidards or improper
delegations of legislative authority.2 1 In miore iecent times the'
SuPreme Court has abandoned all talk of standards and
federal law and practice today is -in accord with a 1940 state-
ment of the Supreme Court: "Delegation by Congress has long
been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of
19. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. '77,
77 L. Ed. 175 (1932).
20. United States v. Rock Royal'Co-bp., 307 U.S. 533, 83 L. Ed. 1446
(1939).
21. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935) ; A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 2d 79 L. Ed. 1570,
97 A.L.R. 947 (1935). See Davis v. Query, 209 S.C. 41, 39 S.E. 117 (1946)
for a discussion of the Panama Refining case, Schechter case, and other
important Federal decisions. -
Attention should be given to the application of the delegation doctrine
in the civil liberties field. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204
(1958) hinted the delegation doctrine might be used in this area. In that
decision the Court held the Secretary of State was not delegated by Con-
gress, unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen
for any substantive reason he might choose. The Court in effect said
that where such important personal rights and liberties are concerned
the delegation by-Congress should be specific and not vague. Also See
Green v. McElroy,, .360 U.S. 474, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959) for an appli-
cation of the Kent v. Dulles idea;
6
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legislative power does not become a futility. '2 2 Numerous
eases have upheld very broad standards and several cases
have upheld delegations without any standard or intelligible
principle explicitly stated in the statute.23 In direct contrast to
this, South Carolina, along with the majority of other states,
has continued to hold fast to the "delegation doctrine" and the
requirement of standards. Even as late as May, 1962, our
court cited with approval a statement from an 1892 federal
case, Field v. Clark , 24 for the proposition that legislative power
cannot be delegated.25 One cannot but question this adherence
to the doctrine. As we have seen earlier, agencies do, in ef-
fect, make law and exercise legislative power. The reason
given for requiring standards is that the administrative
agency or official will have a guide to follow in the action
taken, so that discretion will not run uncontrolled, end in
arbitrariness or substantially deviate from the statutory pur-
pose. Are not other methods available which will accomplish
the same purpose equally as well, if not better? Other means
of control include (1) requirement of procedural safeguards,
(2) legislative supervision and (3) judicial review.2 6 It is
certainly true that some means of control is more necessary
on the state level than the federal level. This is due to the
various fields state law has to regulate, direct effect on a
person's earning of a livelihood, petty officials often times
entrusted with administration, and the legitimate fear of un-
fair and discriminatory administration. The following dis-
cussion will attempt to give some meaning and understand-
ing to the various facets of the problem -as expressed- in South
Carolina, with emphasis on the interpretation our court has
given the "delegation doctrine," and with suggestions of pos-
sible alternative methods of dealing with the problem.
22. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 84 L. Ed.
1263 (1940).
23. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 91 L. Ed. 2030 (1947) ; St. Louis,
I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 52 L. Ed. 1061 (1908);
American Trucking Ass'n. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 97 L. 'Ed. 337
(1953) is perhaps the best example here. The Court upheld the ICC's
issuance of rules which changed certain leasing practices by the motor
carriers where standard rules was present. See 1 DAvis, ADmliSTRATmVE
LAW TREATISE § 2.01-2.04 (1958) for a complete discussion of present'day
Federal law.
24. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892).
25. Cole v. fanning, supra note 18. The Court was drawing an analogy
with a similar federal case, United States v. Ruckman, 169 F. Supp.. 160
(D.C.'W.Va 1959) which contained a reference to the statement from the
Field casd.
26. 1 DAvis op. cit. supra note 6, § 2.08. -
[Vol. 14
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SOUTH CAROLINA CASES ANALYZED
Having seen the courts' attitude toward delegations of leg-
islative authority, we are now faced with the task of exam-
ining the holdings of cases where this obstacle has been raised.
The court is armed with the propositions that (1) legislative
power cannot be delegated, (2) that filling up the details or
acting under and in pursuance of the law is not exercising
legislative power, and (3) that any delegation must be ac-
companied with standards to guide administrative action. The
court in almost every decision uses these legal cliches, accom-
panied by citation of authorities, in decisions where the dele-
gation is found to be either valid or invalid. Complete confu-
sion results when we adhere strictly to these statements in an
attempt to examine and analyze these decisions. Therefore
in order to facilitate the study of these cases, they have been
classified into groups according to the interest involved. It
will become apparent as we go along that different considera-
tions come into play according to the type of interest involved,
whether it be a general economic regulation or the licensing of
a profession. These considerations, more often than not, are
the deciding factors in the cases and the legal cliches are
only pegs which the court uses to hang its decision upon.
Licensing of trades and professions
In this area we must be aware of the fact that a person's
livelihood is at stake.- Many times the refusal of a license
or the revocation of a license may result in extreme hardships
and often times is fatal. Coupled with this the fact that the
examining board is normally made up of members of the pro-
fession, thus giving an ideal opportunity for arbitrary dis-
crimination, we can see why the judiciary tends to be skeptical
and look- more closely at these types of delegations. In State
v. Ross,27 a 1937 decision, the defendant was tried and con-
victed of operating a business of cosmetic art without the
required license. The defendant attacked the constitutionality
of the act under which she was tried and convicted. As one
ground of attack Mrs. Ross alleged that the act, which regu-
lated the occupation of hairdressers and cosmetologists,' dele-
gated legislative powers to the Board of Cosmetic Art Exam-
27. State V. Ross, 185 S.C. 472, 194 S.E. 439 (1937); See Assid v.
City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 47, 18 S.E.2d 287 (1942); where a delegation
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iners. The court made no mention of "standards," but
immediately stated that legislative power could not be dele-
gated. In order to lby-pass'this obstaclethe court quoted this
statement from Zocke's. Appel :218 "The Legislature cannot
delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law-.to
delegate a power to, determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or.intends to make, its own action
depend," The courtfelt the Board was performing "only acts
of executive administration which are in no sense legislative."
Yet as we have seen, in actuality, the promulgation of rules
and regulations is "making law." Could not the delegation
have been just as easily found invalid by use of these legal
cliches? The answer without hesitation is yes; but if we look
behind these statements to other considerations we find strong
support for the holding. The act provided for adequate pro-
cedural safeguards, notice and hearing, and a right of judicial
review was grantedi. Therefore it is evident that very good
protection was provided against arbitrary action. True, the
court rendered the right decision, but this fails to excuse its
use of the "legal cliches" as -a basis for its decision. The em-
phasis should have been placed where it belonged--on the pro-
vision for judicial review, and procedural safeguards.
The next case'we 'shall gonsider could fit easily into several
classifications, but dlet o the power of revocation involved it
is better dealt with in this area. The case in question is South
Carolim Highway Department v. Harbin,- decided in 1955.
The Court was reviewing an order of the circuit cou'rt setting
aside and declaring null and void a suspension by the lHighway
Department of the driver's license of the defendant. The
Highway Department had suspended the license because the
defendant has accumulated a total of 12 points, which accord-
ing to the Department's" "point system" called-for suspension
if recommended after interview of the defendant by the De-
partment. Although not expressedly authorized by the statute
to set up a "point system," the Department did so in reliance
on the broad authority to suspend or revoke licenses for a
period of not more than a year for any cause it deemed satis-
factory,3 0 together with the authority to promote rules and
regulations for the Administration and enforcement of the
28. Locke's Appeal, supra note 10.
29. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585. 86 S.E.2d
466 (1955).
30. CoDE oF LAWS Or SOUTH CAROLINA, § 46-172 (1952).
[Vol. 14
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act.31 The court concluded that the Department was without
authority to adopt the "point system" because the provision of
the statute authorizing the Department to suspend or revoke
a driver's license for "cause satisfactory" to it was an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative authority. In reaching thi
conclusion the court, speaking through Justice Oxner, acceptedl
and applied with full force the "standards" test. According
to several noted authorities, this was an excellent illustration,
of what's wrong with the "standards" test.3 2 The court agaim
stated that legislative power could not be delegated, but they
recognized that an administrative agency may "fill up the"
details." The court in setting out the requirement of standards
or an intelligible principle, applied the requirement to the
instant case as follows: "When the authority of the State
Highway Department to suspend or revoke a license for any
cause which it deems satisfactory is considered in the light of
the foregoing principles, said provision must be declared in-
valid as an unlawful delegation of legislative power. It sets
up no standard to guide the department and contains no limita-
tions. As a general rule, 'A statute which in effect reposes
an absolute, unregulated, and undefined discretion in an ad-
ministrative body bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful
delegation of legislative powers.' 33 Certainly by reading the
statute as a whole we can find a standard4 as counsel for the
Department contended. An obvious limitation is found in
Section 56-174(3) in the language, "for cause satisfactory"
to the Highway Department. The Court took pains to point
out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is but a mere
privilege as opposed to a right. Although the reasoning is
doubtful, there is authority to the effect that the label "priv-
ilege" is enough to justify arbitrariness. Or as phrased by a
Washington court, "Where the statute deals only with a priv-
ilege which the state is free to withdraw completely at any
time, the courts are less strict in the application of the dele-
31. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 46-187 (1952).
32. 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.11 at 123 (1958).
Professor Davis uses the Harbin case as illustrating a misuse of the
"mumbo-jumbo" required by the standards principle. He felt that the
delegation should have been upheld . See also an article by Professor
Earnest L. Folk III of the University of South Carolina Law School
found in 13 S.C.L.Q. 414 at 425 n. 39. The article is entitled, Some Develop-
ments in Administrative Law: A Comment on Davis, Administrative Law
Text.
33. South Carolina Highway Dep't v Harbin supra note 29, at 595.
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gation principle than where the statute affects an established
personal or property right. ' 34 One Court has even gone so
far as to say that discretion relating to a privilege may be
an "arbitrary discretion". 35 Certainly the fact that the Court
was dealing with a "privilege" did not make their case against
a valid delegation any stronger.
As pointed out earlier, there is a legitimate sensitivity by
the courts in this area due to the loss of livelihood possibility
and the fear of arbitrary administration. However, in this
instance, administration was being handled by a regularly con-
stituted agency, procedural safeguards were present including
notice and administrative interview, and all this was followed
by a judicial hearing. This would seem to tip the scales in
favor of upholding the delegation. It is doubtful whether
any further protection would have been obtained by the in-
clusion of a standard. Professor Davis sums it up very well
in this statement, "The fault lies not with the South Carolina
Court for failing to inquire into the practical consequences of
a decision either way; the fault lies in the general doctrine
that some mumbo-jumbo must go with each delegation of
legislative power, and that the courts will refuse to supply
the mumbo-jumbo.
30
Power affecting the use of real property
Any delegation in this area will be closely and carefully
scrutinized. The reason is obvious. It is simply that through-
out the history of the common law the courts have been very
zealous toward protecting the property rights of land owners.
This sensitivity has colored decisions involving delegations
which affect the use of real property. As one writer aptly
put it, it is an occasion when "judicial nerves tingle."
3 7 South
Carolina has several decisions in this area. A city ordinance
requiring the altercation, repair or destruction of houses
deemed unfit for human habitation was the focal point of
Richards v. City of Columbia, a 1955 decision. 38 The ordinance
34. Senior Citizens League v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn.
2d 142, 765, 228 P.2d 478, 491 (1951). For authority in S. C. see Port
Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 9 S.E. 686 (1888). A discussion
on this case will follow later in the article.
35. Blackman v. Board of Liquor Control, 95 Ohio App. 177, 182, 113
N.E.2d 893, 895 (1952).
36. 1 DAVIS, op cit. supra, note 6, § 2.11 at 125.
37. Jaffe, Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUM.L.REV. 561, 586
(1947).
38. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 68 683 (1955).
520 [Vol. 14
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was upheld except certain portions of section nine, 39 which
the Court struck out as not containing a sufficiently definite
standard or yardstick to guide the commission in its determi-
nation that a dwelling is unfit for human habitation. The
Court relied on the Harbin4O case as authority for this holding.
As pointed out earlier, there was a standard present in the
Harbin case, and in the instant case there also seems to be a
sufficient standard, because the commission was to declare
a dwelling unfit for human habitation only "if conditions
existing in such dwelling or dwelling unit are dangerous or in-
jurious to the health, safety, or morals of the occupants...,,41
The Court relied so strongly on Harbin they failed to state
any reasons for requiring a standard. Again we are faced
with the Courts blind adherence to the standards test. Not
only was a standard present to offer its limited protection,
but procedural safeguards (notice and hearing) were also
present to guard against any arbitrary action. Certainly the
application of the standards requirement in this instance re-
sulted in a destruction of the true objective, which is primarily
39. Section 9. Standards of Dwellings or Dwelling Units Fit for
Human Habitation. The Commission and/or the Rehabilitation Director
may determine that a dwelling unit is unfit for human habitation if con-
ditions existing in such dwelling or dwelling unit are dangerous or in-
jurious to the health, safety or morals of the occupants of such dwelling
or dwelling unit, the occupants of neighboring dwellings or other residents
of the City.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing the following conditions
are hereby declared essential to make a dwelling fit for human habitation:
A. Inside running water connected to a kitchen sink, and to a lavatory
or laundry sink, and to a bathtub or shower, and to a toilet, all connected
to the public sewer, or other disposal approved by the City Board of
Health;
B. Adequate screens and glass panes for all doors and windows;
C. Fireplaces, flues, or other provisions for heating to afford reason-
able comfort;
D. A window in each living room and bedroom which opens not less
than 45% of its area and can be effectively opened and closed as a means
of ventilation;
E. Electrical wiring system connected and installed in accordance with
the electrical ordinance of the City.
F. Privacy for toilet and tub or shower, effectively ventilated.
G. The roof, flashings, exterior walls, basement walls, floors and all
doors and windows exposed to the weather constructed and maintained
so as to be reasonably weather tight and water tight, and sound and safe,
and capable of affording privacy.
In addition to the foregoing, a dwelling unit may be found to be unfit
for human habitation if there are defects therein increasing the hazards
of fire, accident, or other calamities, conditions making the structure un-
safe, unsanitary, or failing to provide for decent living or which are
likely to cause sickness or disease.
[The italicized portions were the part struck out by the Court.]
40. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, supra note 29.
41. See 9 S.C.L.Q. 2 (1956) for a critical discussion of this case by
Professor George Savage King in his survey article on administrative law.
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the prevention of arbitrariness. Rationalization of this de-
cision can only be accomplished by contributing such a result
to the sensitive feeling toward real property held by the
Courts. 42
In Henderson v. City of Greenwood43 and Goodale v. So-
welt "4 we see again this sensitivity come to the fore. In both
cases the Court was concerned with the ease with which land-
owners were deprived or restricted in the use of their prop-
erty. In neither case was the delegation of legislative power a
crucial issue. In Henderson v. City of Greenwood a city ordi-
nance forbidding erection of a building within 200 feet of rail-
road crossing without special permission of city council was
held unconstitutional as being unreasonable. The plaintiff's
use of his property was subject to the absolute, undefined, and
uncontrolled discretion of the city council. The statute at issue
in Goodale v. Sowell exempted certain portions of Chesterfield
County from operation of the general stock law, requiring
residents within the exempted sections to build and keep in
good repair a fence along the lines described therein. The
Court found that portion of the statute unconstitutional as a
taking of private property without compensation and without
consent. It was likewise unconstitutional in that "it conferred
upon the commissioners.., arbitrary powers of discrimina-
tion.145 Attorneys should be conscious of this sensitivity when
concerned with delegations in this area.
46
42. For a South Carolina decision in this area pertaining to zoning see
Momeier v. John McAlister, Inc., 203 S.C. 353, 27 S.E.2d 504 (1941), where
the Court upheld the discretion given the Board of Adjustment by the
city ordinance as being only administrative in character, relating to the
execution of the ordinance, to be exercised under the pursuance of the
law, rules, and standard set forth.
43. Henderson v. City of Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 172 S.E. 689 (1932).
44. Goodale v. Sowell, 62 S.C. 516, 40 S.E. 970 (1901).
45. Id. at 525.
46. Worthy of mention at this point is the recent case of Atkinson v.
Carolina Power & Light Co., 239 S.C. 150, 112 S.E.2d 743 decided Septem-
ber, 1961. The Supreme Court there upheld the circuit court's order that
the land undertaken to be condemned in fee by the Electric Co., was
reasonable and necessary for the construction and operation of a gen-
erating plant. The attack was predicated upon an unwarranted delegation
of the power of eminent domain to a private utility. By CODE or LAws OF
SOUTH CAnOLiNA § 24-12 the Legislature has expressedly delegated to the
aefendant co. and all other similarly engaged the power of eminent
domain. The opinion contains the following language: ".... In the exer-
cise of that power those to whom it has been delegated represent the
sovereignty of the state, and are empowered to decide, subject only to
supervision of the courts to avoid fraudulent or capricous abuse, what and
how much land of the citizens they will condemn for their purposes."
See also Bookhart v. Central Elec. Power Co. Co-op., 222 S.C. 289, 72
S.E.2d 576 (1951).
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Power affecting the public health, safety, morals, and welfare
The general rule, as we have seen, is that statutes or ordi-
nances which confer discretionary authority without having
laid down rules for guidance may be successfully attacked
on the ground that they confer undefined, uncontrolled, and
arbitrary powers rendering them invalid. However, over the
years an equally well settled exception to this general rule
has developed, "where it is difficult or impracticable to lay
down a definite comprehensive rule, or the discretion relates
to the administration of a police regulation and is necessary
to protect the public morals, health, safety, and general wel-
fare. '47 Thus the ordinary rule requiring standards, which
has been accepted in South Carolina, is relaxed somewhat
when concerned with an exercise of the police power.
In City of Darlington v. Stanley48 decided July, 1961, the
Court was squarely faced with this problem. The City of Dar-
lington had an ordinance prohibiting the staging of a parade
or a procession on the streets without a permit. Appellants
were convicted in the Municipal Court of Darlington for vio-
lating this ordinance. On appeal the ordinance was attacked
as being unconstitutional in that it fixed no standard or guide
for the granting or denial of a permit, and left the matter
to the uncontrolled will of the City Council. In a unanimous
decision the Court held the ordinance constitutional. This de-
cision was reached by applying the foregoing exception. But
the Court in its application of the exception seems to go much
further than necessary. No standard or guide in the statute
was found, but instead, the Court had to rely on implicit
standards. In the opinion of the Court we find the following
language: "The standard to be applied is obvious from the
purpose of the ordinance. It would be of little or no value to
state that the standard by which the City Council should be
guided is the safety, comfort and convenience of persons
using the street. That is already implicit in the statute as
we see it.''49 Yet in Section 2 of the ordinance we find that
the permit is to be issued "subject to the public convenience
and public welfare". (Emphasis added).50 Standards such as
these have long been held adequate.51 This certainly was a huge
47. Annot., 92 A.L.R. 400 at 410.
48. City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207 (1961).
49. Id. at 147.
50. Id. at 143.
51. The United States Supreme Court has held adequate, standards
including "public interest," New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States,
19621
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step to take if we consider the attitude of the Court in the
Harbin case5 2 and their refusal in that instance to look beyond
the narrow section in question to find a standard. The only
explanation given by the Court for this sudden liberalism is
necessity: "It clearly appears that it would be practically im-
possible to formulate in an ordinance a uniform plan or system
relative to every conceivable parade or procession." 53 The
motivating reason is more likely the fact that we are concerned
here with an exercise of the police power for protection of
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. This clearly
illustrates the reason for an analysis of the case according to
the interest involved, and for not relying completely on the
"legal clich6s" used by the Court. The reasons for the holdings
go much deeper.
In a decision filed August 20, 1962, the Supreme Court in
an analagous situation found the ordinance in question un-
constitutional. The case was City of Florence v. George.54
Thirty four appellants (all of whom were Negro high school
students) conducted a parade upon the city streets of Florence
and were convicted of violating a city ordinance which pro-
hibited the staging of any parade upon the public streets of
the City of Florence without first obtaining a permit from the
Chief of Police. The case received wide publicity due to its
civil rights overtones. The attorneys for the City of Florence
contended that the exception which the Court had applied in
the Stanley case applied here. Associate Justice Bussey, speak-
ing for the Court, replied: "Here, the ordinance is completely
devoid of any language which would warrant the Court in
drawing any implication therefrom in favor of its constitu-
tionality. Without any preamble, explanation or qualifiying
words whatsoever, it vests the absolute control of parades in
the Chief of Police of the City. The ordinance in the Stanley
case contained a full and comprehensive preamble as to the
purpose of the ordinance; required an application which would
contain various pertinent information which would be needed
287 U.S. 12, 77 L. Ed. 138 (1932) ; "public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity," Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 285, 77 L. Ed. 1166 (1933). Among the many state decisions see
State ex rel. Oregon Railroad & N. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 52 Wash.,
17, 100 Pac. 179 (1909), where "just, fair, & reasonable" was considered
a proper standard.
52. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, supra note 29.
53. City of Darlington v. Stanley, supra, note 48, at 147.
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by the municipality in order to intelligently grant permits in
keeping with the municipality's right to control parades in con-
sideration of and relation to other proper uses of the streets;
and provided that 'the mayor or city council shall, in its dis-
cretion, issue such permit subject to the public convenience
and welfare'." 55 Justice Bussey is quite correct in the differ-
ences he draws between the two cases. Obviously, his concern
is over the uncontrolled discretion given the Chief of Police.
He feels, and quite correctly so, that no protection is given
against arbitrary action. Our disagreement is over the means
of preventing such arbitrariness. It is submitted that the
problem would have been the same had the ordinance included
the vague words called "standards." True protection could
be obtained much better through the use of procedural safe-
guards and in various outside checks and supervision upon
discretionary power.56 The decision reached is a correct one,
but the weakness is in the emphasis placed upon standards
and in a failure to examine the other methods affording a
better protection against arbitrariness.
Also falling within this area is the interesting case of Kirk
v. Board of Health.57 Here the Board of Health of the City of
Aiken reached the conclusion that Mrs. Kirk, a resident of the
City, was afflicted with leprosy, contagious in its nature, and
passed resolutions requiring her to be removed to the city
hospital for infectious diseases. The municipal Boards of
Health derive such authority for Article 8, Section 10 of the
State Constitution and from Section 1099 of the South Caro-
lina Code of Laws. The Court, without hesitation, declared
this was not a delegation of legislative power, "it is merely
the providing of the agency for carrying out the legislative
enactment.""8 We can rationalize this case by an awareness
that the rules are relaxed when the power concerned is an
exercise of the police power for the protection of the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare.
This area also encompasses statutes which pertain to al-
coholic beverage manufacture and distribution. In 1946, in
the case of Davis v. Query,5 9 the Supreme Court held that the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act under which the State Tax
55. Id. at 9.
56. See 1 DAVIS, Op. cit. supra note 6, § 2.09.
57. Kirk v. Board of Health, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (1909).
58. Id. at 379.
59. Davis v. Query, 209 S.C. 41, 39 S.E.2d 117 (1946).
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Commission was given authority to pass reasonable regulations
for the manufacture, possession, transportation and use of
alcoholic liquors was not unconstitutional as a delegation of
legislative authority to the Commission. "A legislative body
may, after declaring a policy and fixing a primary standard,
confer upon executive or administrative officers the 'power to
fill up the details' by prescribing administrative rules and
regulations to promote the purpose and spirit of the legislation
and to carry it into effect. o00 The Court found that "equitable
distribution" was an adequate standard. This holding coin-
cides with the decisions of the majority of states on this sub-
ject.01 Although chief reliance was placed on the overworked
standards test and its group of legal cliches, the recognition
by the court of the increasing necessity for delegation in this
modern age was quite enlightening: "The practical side of the
problem is very apparent. The General Assembly meets once
a year, the commission constantly. Equitable distribution may
require one rule of conduct by the liquor dealers one month
and another the next. Hence the situation requires a flex-
ibility of control which is not possible under the rigidity of
legislative acts."
62
Power to license the use of property
Here again we run into the feeling of sensitivity which the
common law has toward the owner of real property. This feel-
ing, when associated with delegations, has produced conflicting
decisions. 63 One of the earliest South Carolina cases in which
the question of a delegation of legislative authority arose, falls
in this area. Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood64 was decided
in 1888. Involved was a state statute delegating to the Board
of Agriculture the power to grant or to refuse licenses to mine
phosphate rock in navigable streams of the state, as the Board
in its discretion might deem best for the interest of the state.
60. Id. at 49-50.
61. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138 at 619 (1955).
62. Davis v. Query, supra note 54, at 49. Also see One Hundred
Second Calvary Officer's Club v. Heise, Sheriff, 201 S.C. 68, 21 S.E.2d
400 (1942) where the rules and regulations of the State Tax Commission
were held to be promulgated in enforcement of the statute, thus the Court
found the delegation to be valid. The particular rules in question permitted
the Officer's Club to store liquor at the Fort free of the State stamp
tax. A controversy ensued when the Commission seized as contraband
some of this liquor which had been temporarily taken from the premises.
63. Jaffe, Delegations of Legislative Power, 47 COLTmi. L. REv. 561,
586 (1947).
64. Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 9 S.E. 686 (1888).
[Vol. 14
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The Board denied the application for license and thereupon
appellant filed this petition to command the Board to issue
the license. The act was attacked as delegating legislative
authority to the Board of Agriculture and failing to specify
a standard, thus leaving the determination of the fitness of
an applicant to the arbitrary and unregulated discretion of
the Board of Agriculture. The Court upheld the statute hold-
ing, "it is undoubtedly true that legislative power cannot be'
delegated, but it is not always easy to say what is and what
is not legislative power, in the sense of the principle. ... While
it is necessary that the law itself should be full and complete
as it comes from the proper law-making body, it may be, in-
deed, must be, left to agents in one form or another to per-
form acts of executive administration, which are in no sense
legislative. ' " As to the standards requirement, the Court
decided that a license to mine in a navigable stream was in
the nature of a special privilege, and subject to absolute
control. In other words the Court is saying that when a
special privilege is involved the legislature may give uncon-
trolled discretion to the State Board and require no standard.
At one point the Court said, "It seems to us that it would be
difficult to frame an act giving larger powers of discretion."'6(
This is a highly questionable ground for disposing of the
standards requirement. The mere fact that we are dealing
with a privilege gives us no license to do with it as we please
One can partially understand why no standard is required
when the licensed use may promote immorality as in the case
of a pool room,67 but in the instant case no immorality was
present. Our quarrel with standards has been because of its
questionable ability to combat and protect against arbitrari-
ness, although it does, at times, give some protection. The
view espoused in this case would even do away with that
limited protection. We can find comfort in the fact that the
trend today is to treat everyone fairly. No case in South
Carolina has been found where this principle was later applied
or even suggested.
65. Id. at 525.
66. Id. at 524.
67. See State v. Sherow, 87 Kan. 235, 123 Pac. 866 (1912) where it has
been held that a statute authorizing township boards to license billard,
pool halls, and bowling alleys is not unconstitutional on the ground that
it grants an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion to such township boards.
1962] LAw NOTEs
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The remaining South Carolina case which falls in this area
is Schloss Poster Advertising Co. v. City of Rock Hill, 68 de-
cided in 1939. The Court held invalid a municipal ordinance
which made it unlawful to erect and maintain billboards facing
on a public street or other public place without a permit. Mr.
Justice Fishburne, speaking for the Court, felt that the ordi-
nance committed "to the unrestrained will of the authorities,
for any reason deemed satisfactory to them, the right and
power to absolutely prohibit the use of property for the erec-
tion of billboards." 69 Thus the tender feeling of the common
law toward the owners of real property revealed itself.
"Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion
which is purely arbitrary and which may be exercised in the
interest of a favored few are unreasonable and invalid.
'70
Such a decision has a number of factors which commend it-
lack of guides or standards, no procedural safeguards, the
grant of substantial power to petty political officials, and the
fact that they were dealing with the real property of an indi-
vidual. 7' Not even the addition of some vague words called
standards would have cured the defect. Cases such as this,
although extreme, do point up the real danger involved and
emphasize the need for protection which standards can not
give. Once standards are exposed for what they really are,
then perhaps delegations to regularly constituted agencies sur-
rounded by procedural safeguards will not be invalidated be-
cause of a lack of statutory guides or standards.
General Business Regulation
Generally, it has been found that in the field of general eco-
nomic regulation state decisions conform very closely to fed-
eral decisions.72 South Carolina has two interesting decisions
in this area. The delegation of legislative authority was not
a central issue in either of the cases. In the case of Railroad,
Commissioners v. Railroad Co.,7 3 the Court held that the stat-
ute giving the railroad commissioners supervision of the rail-
roads was constitutional. The Court said it has long been
68. Schloss Poster Advertising Co. v. City of Rock Hill, 190 S.C. 92,
2 S.E.2d 392 (1939).
69. Id. at 96.
70. Id. at 97.
71. I DAVIS op. cit. supra note 6, § 2.10.
72. Jaffe, Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUm. L. RFv. 561,
585 (1941).
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settled that a state legislature has the right to intrust such
supervision to a Board of Commissioners. In a 1960 decision
which provoked much discussion, the Supreme Court found
the statute which purported to give the State Dairy Com-
mission power to regulate retail prices was to that extent un-
constitutional. Although not mentioned in the majority opin-
ion, Justice Oxner in a lengthy dissent stated that if the legis-
lature could control the price of milk, then, "there is no doubt
that such authority may be delegated to an administrative
agency provided the legislature fixes adequate standards by
which such agency is to be governed or lays down a well de-
fined and intelligent principle to which such agency must
conform."7 4 Justice Oxner rendered no opinion on whether
the standards were adequate since this was not a ground of
demurrer.
Delegations which involve criminal proceedings
It is generally thought that the legislature may not delegate
to an administrative agency the power to determine whether
the violation of its rules is punishable75 or the power to create
a penal sanction for the violation. 76 But it seems established
that a statute may delegate to an administrative agency the
power to determine the elements of a criminal offense if a
sufficient primary standard exists.77 The Courts, though, tend
to construe and look more closely at the sufficiency of the
standard in those cases where the regulations have penal
sanctions. This is illustrated by the following language:
".... the delegation of its power is even more extreme, for it
makes it a misdemeanor for any citizen to violate any rule or
regulation hereafter made by these authorities.17 8 (Emphasis
added.)
In Cole v. Manning,79 a very recent decision by the South
Carolina Supreme Court, this very problem was presented.
74. Gwynette v. Myers, 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E.2d 673 (1960) ; during the
1961 session the legislature enacted a new Dairy Commission Act. It is
Act No. 319 of 1961. For a discussion of the Act, what it includes, and its
interesting new features see the following survey article: Folk, Adminis-
trative Law, 1961 Survey of S. C. Law, 14 S.C.L.Q. 215 (1961).
75. Peoples v. Grant, 267 N.Y. 508, 196 N.E. 553 (1935).
76. See Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication: An Analysis, 51 PoL.
ScI. Q. 383, 516 (1936).
77. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1910). For
state decisions following the rule of Grimaud see Howard v. State, 154
Ark. 430, 242 S.W. 818 (1922); State v. Normaud, 76 N.H. 541, 85 Atl.
899 (1913).
78. Darweger v. Stoats, 267 N.Y. 290 at 307, 196 N.E. 61 (1935).
79. Cole v. Manning, supra note 18.
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Appellants had been tried and convicted with conspiracy to
violate Section 55-14 of the 1952 Code by furnishing to prison-
ers in the State Penitentiary ten thousand tablets of amphe-
tamine, "Pep Pills", a drug that had been declared contraband
by the Director of Prisons. The appeal came up on a denial of
their prayer for release after a writ of habeas corpus had been
issued on their petition. Section 55-14 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to furnish any
prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections with any matter declared by the Director to
be contraband. Matters considered contraband within the
meaning of this section shall be those matters determined
to be such by the Director and published by him in a
conspicuous place available to visitors at each correctional
institution. The violation of the provisions of this section
shall constitute a felony and anyone convicted thereof
shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand
dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars, or imprison-
ment for not less than one year nor more than ten years,
or both.80
This section is part of the act establishing a Department of
Corrections to carry out the policy of the state with respect
to its prison system.81 The Court answered the contention that
Section 55-14 was an unlawful delegation of legislative power
by asserting that it was a proper delegation which did not
vest the Director of Prisons with arbitrary powers. The stand-
ard found was only a general legislative policy to prohibit
those things to be furnished prisoners detrimental to their
welfare and the proper operation of the prison. Justice Bus-
sey filed a strong dissent in which he concluded that the
Director had unregulated discretion with no standard to guide
him. He viewed the Harbin case82 as controlling.
In view of the general attitude of courts in this area coupled
with views our court has expressed over the years, this de-
cision is a surprising one. Normally, as pointed out earlier,
where penal sanctions are imposed the courts require very
adequate standards. In the instant case, our court found no
express standard at all but relied entirely on the legislative
intent, as expressed by a reading of the entire act. Possibly
80. CoD. or LAWS o0 SOUTH CAROLNA § 55-14 (1952).
81. COD oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 55-261 to 291 (Supp. 1960).
82. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, supra note 29.
[Vol. 14
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the word "contraband" could have been considered as a stand-
ard, but as Justice Bussey points out in the dissent this is
impossible because the Director declares what is to be contra-
band; consequently, it does not even carry its usual legal
connotation. There seemed to be some confusion with those
cases involving an exercise of the police power where the
general rule requiring standards is relaxed. 5 Judge Bussey's
decision that the end result is control being placed in the
unregulated and uncontrolled discretion of the Director of
Prisons is correct. But the situation would not be greatly
improved if some "mumbo-jumbo" called standards was added.
Procedural safeguards and other outside administrative checks
would better remedy the situation.
It is true, however, that a higher degree of performance by
the legislature resulting in a better drafted statute would
aid greatly in this instance in the protection needed against
arbitrariness.
Interesting to note is the reference made in the dissent by
Justice Bussey that "the actual crime is created by the deci-
sions of the director in his untrammeled discretion." It is as-
sumed that Justice Bussey is referring to that line of authority
which holds that the creation of a crime is an "exclusive" func-
tion of the legislature. Since a crime is made up of the elements
as well as the penalty, this view holds that when the rules and
regulations of the agency provide the elements, then the viola-
tion is not made a crime solely by the action of the legisla-
ture.814 The fallacy in such reasoning is that the majority of
jurisdictions, including the federal law, have decided that the
creation of a criminal offense is not the "exclusive" function
of the legislature.8 5 However a sufficient primary standard
has always been required. This is where the instant case goes
even further than the general rule.86
83. Cole v. Manning, supra note 18 at 624.
84. United States v. Matthews, 146 Fed. 306 (D.C. Cir. 1906); Feeman
v. State, 131 Ohio St. 85, 1 N.E.2d 620 (1936). For an excellent discussion
on all phases of this problem see Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its
Creation and Punishment by Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REv.
51 (1943).
85. McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397, 63 L. Ed. 668 1918;
United States v. Grimaud, supra at note 69; Kryden v. State, 214 Ind.
419, 15 N.E.2d 386 (1938); Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526, 121 S.W.2d
737 (1938).
86. This area is not to be confused with the situations where the
Administrative agency is given the authority to prescribe civil sanctions.
This is permissable. In such case the determination of what is a civil
penalty as opposed to a criminal penalty is vital. See Stoval v. Sawyer,
181 S.C. 379. 187 S.E. 821 (1936) for a delegation of this type. The
Court held there was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
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Delegation to private partiess7
In the preceding discussion we have dealt with cases
where the delegation was to administrative agencies. A group
of similar problems are presented where the delegation is
to private groups. Frequently, the Courts have said that
power may not be delegated to private persons to govern other
persons. 88 In the Carter case where the United States Supreme
Court held a delegation to producers and miners of coal
of the power to fix maximum hours and minimum wages
to be invalid, we find the following language: "The power
conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to re-
gulate the affairs of an unwilling minority."' 9 But there
has been no consistency in the application of this principle.
Many delegations of this type have been upheld.9 0 The result
is that some authorities in the field have said that the direct
delegation of governmental power to private parties has be-
come an established fact,9 1 whereas others feel the case law
has not yet crystallized into any consistent principles.92 South
Carolina has several cases on this subject worthy of exami-
nation. In the case of Willis v. Town of Woodruff9 3 an ordi-
nance of that town purporting to grant applicant's request
for a permit to build a filling station, if agreeable with other
property owners, was held void as being unreasonable and
discriminatory in that it attempted an improper delegation of
governmental power to private citizens. In 1928 the United
States Supreme Court reached a similar result in an analagous
situation. 4 The Courts seem impressed by the arbitrary
power left in the hands of unofficial persons.
power when the Highway Dept. by a regulation defined the term "non-
resident" in the statute.87. This note does not attempt to cover in detail delegations to private
parties, but only to lay out the general principles in this area.
88. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 57 L. Ed. 157 (1912).
89. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
90. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 16, 83 L. Ed. 411 (1939); Thomas
Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 61 L. Ed. 472 (1917); Cleveland v.
City of Watertown, 222 N.Y. 159, 118 N.E. 500 (1917); Also see Gaud
v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316 (1949), where the Court held that
statutes providing for the electors of Charleston County to choose one
of two plans for municipal government was not an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power. Laws such as this have generally been sus-
tained. See Note, Constitutionality of the Referendum, 41 YALE LJ. 132,
134 (1931) for additional cases on this subject.
91. Note, Delegation of Power to Private Parties, 37 COLUM.L.REV. 447
(1937).
92. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 6, § 2.14 (1958).
93. Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699 (1942).
94. See State of Washington ex tel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
278 U.S. 116, 73 L. Ed. 210 (1928) where the Court held unconstitutional
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State v. Taylor9 5 is illustrative of another line of cases. The
Supreme Court upheld a statute providing for a technical
livestock committee empowered to promulgate and enforce
rules and regulations pertaining to supervision of livestock
markets, stockyards, and dealers, to prevent spread of live-
stock diseases. At issue was the power granted trustees and
certain officers to appoint the four men comprsing the com-
mittee. The court applied the rule set out in Ashmore v.
Greater Greenville Sewer District9 6 that delegation to persons,
groups, or organizations, unrelated to government of power
to nominate, appoint, or elect public officers is unconstitu-
tional as being an invalid delegation of legislative power,
unless a substantial and rational relation exists between those
persons and the law to be administered by the appointees or
electees or to the public institution to be governedY7  The
Court found a rational relation to the law to be administered.
In as much as delegation to private parties in a number
of situations constitutes a justifiable development, rules
should be applied by the courts to prevent injustice and
arbitrariness. The means for protection against arbitrariness
that we have explored in examining delegations to adminis-
trative bodies would no doubt be easily applied in the field. 98
It is essential that some protection be provided. 99
Miscellaneous
Several South Carolina cases fall outside of the areas pre-
viously discussed, yet a discussion of them is needed. Among
an ordinance prohibiting an old people's home in a zoning district without
consent of a designated portion of neighbors.
95. State v. Taylor, 223 S.C. 526, 77 S.E.2d 195 (1953).
96. Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d
88 (194'7).
97. Id. at 95; See Floyd v. Thornton, Sec. of State, 220 S.C. 414, 68
S.E.2d 334 (1951) where court held that statute providing that two mem-
bers of board of bank control shall be appointed by Governor upon recom-
mendation of Bankers' Association and one upon recommendation of
representatives of cash depositories was not an illegal delegation of legis-
lative power.
98. Note, Delegation of Powers to Private Parties, 37 COLUIm. L. REV.
447 (1937). An excellent discussion on this topic can also be found by
Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937).
99. The Fair Trade laws have also been attacked on this ground. In
the Old Dearborn case [Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 81 L. Ed. 109 (1936)] the United States upheld the
validity of a non-signer provision. South Carolina in the case of Rogers
Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 90 S.E.2d 665 (1957) held
its Fair Trade Act unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without
due process of law. The Court did not refer to the argument concerning
unlawful delegation of legislative power.
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these is the case of State ex. rel. Richards v. Moorer,100 con-
sidered by many to be the leading South Carolina decision
on the "delegation doctrine." The statute being attacked was
an act providing for the construction and maintenance of the
state highway system. The statute provided an alternate plan
for financing the highway system and gave the Highway Com-
mission the option to choose between a state unit plan or a
district unit plan of financing. It was contended that this
was an illegal delegation of legislative power. The Court found
the contention was without merit. The reasoning of the Court
was as follows: "There is no question here of alternative laws.
There is but one law, with alternative plans of financing pro-
vided for the purpose of carrying out the law. The act, as it
came from the hands of the legislature, is complete in itself
in form and substance. . . . The Highway Commission is
given no power to add to, or to take away from the law as
enacted. ... The authority conferred upon the commission
... is an authority or discretion as to the execution of the law,
being merely a choice of method of procedure for carrying out
the purpose of the Act, and is nothing more than provision
for efficient execution and administration of a finished stat-
ute."' 01 There is nothing novel in this reasoning, but it is
the first ease in which our Court really took the time to
examine the "delegation doctrine". References are made to
a number of cases from other jurisdictions, and the South
Carolina decisions up until this time were reviewed. The
legal cliches we have been examining in this article received
their real beginning in this case. Very few times subsequent
to this did the Court ever look behind these statements to the
heart of the problem. A quotation of the cliches and authori-
ties to back them up provided a ready answer to any future
contention that there was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held in another case
falling within this category that the legislature could not
have delegated to a municipality the power to pass an ordi-
nance affecting the jurisdiction of the courts of the state.'02
In Ruff v. Boulware, Co. Supervisor'"3 an act providing for
100. State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 470, 150 S.E. 269
(1929), Cort denied, 281 U.S. 691, 74 L. Ed. 1120 (1930).
101. State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, supra note 79, at 484.
102. Vesta Mills v. City Council, 60 S.C. 1, 38 S.E. 226 (1901).
103. Ruff v. Boulware, Co. Supervisors, 133 S.C. 420, 131 S.E. 29 (1925).
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establishment of a chain gang in Fairfield County on the unan-
imous written consent of the legislative delegation was held
not void as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
In two other decisions a statute declaring that it shall be law-
ful for the city council of any city whose population is between,
two thousand and twenty thousand to establish a municipaL
couit was upheld, 0 4 as was the delegation to the court, giving-
them the power to declare a drainage district duly incor-
porated. 0 5
CONCLUSION
The tendency today is toward more and greater delegations
of power to administrative bodies. In response to this trend,
the South Carolina Supreme Court in particular, and the state
courts in general, have failed to meet this challenge. They still
adhere to the theoretical view that legislative power cannot be
delegated, but realizing the practical necessity of delegations,
they allow them only if accompanied by sufficient guides or
standards. Most delegations are upheld. This is accomplished
by finding that the power conferred is administrative and per-
tains only to the execution of the laws or by finding the exist-
ence of the required standard. It is submitted that an outright
recognition by the Courts that agencies do in effect make law
and exercise legislative power is a necessity. Certainly we
will all agree that the legislature does not have a monopoly
on wisdom. Yet this is in effect what we are saying by re-
104. City of Greenville v. Foster, 101 S.C. 318, 85 S.E. 769 (1914).
105. Dillon Catfish Drainage District v. Bank of Dillon, 143 S.C. 178,
141 S.E. 274 (1927); See the cases listed below for delegations in the
following categories: (1) Motor Vehicles-Fisher v. J. H. Sheridan Co.,
182 S.C. 316, 326, 189 S.E. 356 (1936); State ex rel. Daniel v. John P.
Nutt Co., 180 S.C. 19, 34, 185 S.E. 25 (1935); Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C.
10, 18, 87 S.E. 421 (1915); Little v. Willhnon, 103 S.C. 50, 87 S.E. 435
(1915); (2) Insurance-Henderson v. McMaster, Ins. Comm'r, 104 S.C.
268, 88 S.E. 645 (1916). (3) Wages, Hours, and Conditions of Labor-
Banks v. Batesbury Hauling Co., 202 S.C. 273, 24 S.E.2d 496 (1942);
Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, Comm'r, 191 S.C. 271, 291, 2 S.E. 2d 36 (1938). (4)
Public Debt and Bonds-Deloach v. Scheper, 188 S.C. 21, 198 S.E. 409
(1938); Bramlette v. Stringer, 186 S.C. 134, 196 S.E. 257 (1937); State
ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625 (1936); Crawford v.
Johnston, Governor, 177 S.C. 399, 406, 181 S.E. 476 (1935); Clarke v.
S. C. Public Serv. Authority, 177 S.C. 427, 444, 181 S.E. 481 (1935);
Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S.C. 362, 170 S.E. 435 (1933). (5) Tax-
ation- State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, Governor, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d
33 (1951) ; Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 169, 115 S.E. 202 (1922) ;
Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller Gen., 4 S.C. 430, (1873). (6) Educa-
tion- Mosely v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 40, 39 S.E.2d 133 (1946); Powell v.
Hargrove, 136 S.C. 345, 134 S.E. 380 (1926); Waterloo School Dist. No.
14 v. Cross Hill School No. 6, 106 S.C. 292, 91 S.E. 257 (1917) : Burriss v.
Brock, 95 S.C. 104, 79 S.E. 193 (1913). (These cases are in addition to the
ones discussed in the note.)
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fusing to admit that legislative power can be delegated. Con-
tinued adherence to this conception can only warp the view
taken of delegations in the future.
By its repeated reference to the requirement of standards,
our Court has failed to examine the reasons for such a require-
ment. The objective is primarily the prevention of arbitrari-
ness. Standards do afford a limited protection, but protection
is also obtained by procedural safeguards, administrative
checks, and judicial review. More specifically, this includes
a hearing with a determination on the record, adequate notice,
specific findings based on sufficient evidence, requirement
that findings and reasons be stated, and periodic re-examina-
tion or continued supervision by the city and state. Provisions
could also be made for judicial review as a matter of right,
thus assuring that the action taken would remain within
statutory bounds, limiting the agency to the power to recom-
mend or require approval after submission, or requiring the
adoption of rules which would give notice to affected parties,
and reduce the scope of the agencies' discretion. The doctrine
functions properly when extreme situations of arbitrariness
are present, but collapses when faced with delegations to reg-
ularly constituted agencies surrounded by these many safe-
guards. An excellent example of this latter situation is found
in the Harbin106 case. In applying the doctrine to a situation
as was present in Harbin, the reason for requiring standards
is defeated. In such a case the standards requirement should
.be relaxed.
In defense of the doctrine it should be noted that in num-
-erous cases invalidated for improper delegations, the legisla-
ture could have better performed the job it delegated. Also the
-use of the doctrine has certainly impressed the legislature with
the importance of well drafted statutes. As previously men-
tioned, the doctrine was invoked many times where provisions
for judicial review were inadequate and there was a lack of
procedural safeguards. We have also failed to notice the need
,state courts might have for standards to guide them in their
judicial review due to a lack of experience in these matters,
and the degree to which state administration has become rid-
dled with arbitrariness and misuse. Easily forgotten is the fact
that the legislature has been entrusted with the job of exer-
cising for the peoples' benefit the law making power; and they
106. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, supra note 29.
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are more responsive to the peoples' wishes because they are
subject to the ballot box. At best the people have only an in-
direct control over the agencies. These reasons however fail
to justify the action taken in many instances. If the doctrine
is to be retained as a tool to be used by the courts, certain
changes must be made. The court should at all times look for
the true intention of the legislature and be conscious of what
they are attempting to accomplish. Above all, the court
should refrain from adhering to its past practice of rigid
conceptualism and examine with an open mind the objectives
sought.
Since these out-dated conceptions are still utilized by the
courts, attorneys should be conscious of this fact and, in an-
alyzing the cases, particular attention should be given to the
type of interest involved. Often times, this will give an in-
dication of the court's attitude in the area under study and
serve to expose considerations the judiciary feels is important.
With the future having in store an increasing amount of
delegation problems, it is hoped the courts will re-examine
this area of the law.
DALTON B. FLOYD, JR.
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